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This tree contains user-specific code and infrastructure. Tracked source follows the repository’s public-source policy. Personal information and secrets must not be tracked or disclosed. Non-secret, non-personal operational facts remain public even when they describe generated or live state.
bazel run //users/simeonwarren:gen_client_cert -- --host phone1 --ttl "180d" --output_dir "${PWD}/certs"
bazel run //users/simeonwarren:opencode -- "${PWD}"
bazel run //users/simeonwarren/tf:tf.apply
ln -s "${PWD}/users/simeonwarren/opencode.json" ~/.config/opencode/opencode.json
ln -s "${PWD}/users/simeonwarren/tui.json" ~/.config/opencode/tui.json
Host Bot runs Traefik with mTLS in front of T3 Code. The host firewall blocks direct external access to T3 Code and accepts new connections only on SSH, HTTP, and HTTPS ports.
The DNS Terraform package uses the dedicated
src_users_simeonwarren_host_bot AppRole through dns_al. Ansible retains
its existing al configuration and user_simeonwarren authentication.
T3 Code controls permissions per thread. Its Auto mode maps to Codex
Auto-review. The managed Codex requirements allow read-only and host-bot
permissions with on-request approvals, so threads cannot select Full
access or disable approvals. The requirements file only allowlists the
host-bot profile; it must not define the profile because T3 Code supplies a
per-thread config layer with the same name, and Codex rejects profiles defined
by both requirements and config. The normal and isolated provider configs
define host-bot with workspace writes, public command-network access, and
write access to the Bazel cache and Bazelisk directories while keeping local
network binding and loopback connections available for Bazel servers. Other
private network targets remain blocked. T3 Code must select that profile for
the thread. Hosted web search is not restricted by this role.
The deployment installs pinned Bazelisk as ~/.local/bin/bazel, provisions
the repository’s bazel_agent runner in the same directory, and pre-seeds its
content-addressed mcp_cordis and repo_delivery runtimes when the canonical
repository checkout is present. New Codex worktrees can then start Cordis and
run delivery operations without first loading their own Bazel graph.
Two SATA SSDs, selected by their stable ATA IDs, back the sata_ssd volume
group. Its striped bazel_cache logical volume is mounted persistently at
/var/cache/bazel. Every Bazel workspace uses its disk_cache directory and
the managed user bazelrc points its output-user root at the same filesystem.
Automatic garbage collection caps the action disk cache at 700 GiB, leaving
room within the 1-TiB filesystem for output bases and install state; the
volume group retains about 900 GiB for later growth or another logical volume.
Because the volume is striped, either SSD failing invalidates the disposable
cache.
The managed user bazelrc limits each Bazel invocation to eight concurrent jobs and budgets half of the host CPUs for local actions. These scheduling limits apply to builds and tests; they do not impose a combined CPU cap across independent Bazel processes or Codex sessions.
Executable repository tools use /var/cache/bazel/tool_cache. Unlike the
disposable action and output caches, this directory is private to the host-bot
account. Cache entries are keyed by declared source, build configuration,
platform, and dependency pins, and are installed atomically after a Bazel
build on the first miss.
The arXiv MCP server is pinned to version 0.7.2 and runs locally over stdio.
Its downloaded papers and search data live under
/srv/misc/arxiv-mcp-server/papers on a reusable 100-GiB misc logical
volume in the existing sata_ssd volume group. The volume is mounted for
reconstructible non-executable application data. Data with durability or
different reliability requirements belongs on a separate volume.
The managed Codex configuration allows up to 20 concurrent subagents per session. The root agent is accounted for separately.
Node.js and npm are provisioned through the development VM role’s mutable or
OSTree package backend. Open Computer Use 0.3.3 is then installed without npm
lifecycle scripts under the managed user’s ~/.local prefix. Its skill is
then installed for the whole host under /etc/codex/skills from the matching
immutable upstream revision. The deployment configures its stdio MCP server in
the normal Codex config and the isolated OpenRouter and Abliteration homes.
The MCP can inspect and control the logged-in desktop session, so agents must treat its actions as real user input and obtain approval before
externally visible or destructive actions.
OpenRouter is available through its isolated Codex home. Its
configuration reads its API key from the desktop keyring entry selected by
service=openrouter and application=codex; the key is not stored in the
configuration. Repository work uses the repo-owned $codex-migration skill, while
the user-level Codex instructions require isolated migration testing and
intentional host changes to be mirrored into this role. Existing sessions are
not redirected because provider-bound encrypted reasoning history cannot
safely migrate in place.
T3 Code can use OpenRouter as a separate Codex provider by setting its
CODEX_HOME path to /var/home/simeonwarrenbot/.codex-openrouter. That
isolated home defaults to ~deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-latest and shares no
conversation state with the ChatGPT-backed Codex provider. Start a new thread
when selecting it.
The OpenRouter no-tools home at ~/.codex-openrouter-no-tools mirrors the
OpenRouter provider with every tool surface disabled. It reuses the same
keyring lookup and model, sets web_search = "disabled", turns off the shell,
unified-exec, image, multi-agent, computer-use, browser, app, plugin, and goal
features, and disables the request_user_input tool and the MCP servers.
Codex then advertises no tools at all, so the model can only reply with text.
This matters beyond tidiness: OpenRouter rejects a request that carries any
tools when its routed endpoint supports none, so a single leftover tool fails
the turn.
T3 Code launches the Codex app server with
-c mcp_servers.t3-code.url=..., so its own MCP server would otherwise
reintroduce the MCP resource tools. The no-tools config therefore declares
[mcp_servers.t3-code] with enabled = false, which still wins over that
launch-time override.
Select it in T3 Code with CODEX_HOME path set to
/var/home/simeonwarrenbot/.codex-openrouter-no-tools and start a new thread.
The Abliteration and standard OpenRouter homes keep their tools.
Abliteration uses a separate home with
CODEX_HOME="$HOME/.codex-abliteration" codex, using the endpoint and model from its
Codex integration guide.
It retrieves its API token at runtime with secret-tool, selecting
service=abliteration and application=codex. Save the token from an
interactive terminal in the same user’s desktop keyring:
secret-tool store --label='Abliteration API token for Codex' service abliteration application codex
Enter the token at the hidden prompt. The configuration contains only the
lookup command. Provider response and tool-call validation require a saved
token. Both providers keep their configuration and conversation state outside
the main Codex home; provider profiles in the main home are removed. For
T3 Code, set its CODEX_HOME path to
/var/home/simeonwarrenbot/.codex-abliteration and start a new thread.
T3_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN authenticates the Codex app-server’s loopback MCP
connection to T3 Code at /mcp. Codex excludes it from model-spawned commands
so those subprocesses do not inherit the credential.
bazel run //users/simeonwarren/host_bot/ansible
Define Host Bot DNS management through the owner’s tf root,
including canonical declarations, scoped credentials, and offline source checks
before adopting live records.
The tf root SHALL consume this owner’s canonical dnsconfig.json through
the shared DNS Terraform module, preserving declared record identities and views.
DNS resources SHALL default to disabled until the shared migration adopts them
and SHALL retain enabled ownership after authorized adoption into the owner’s
state. Reconciliation of adopted records with unchanged declarations SHALL
propose no record additions, changes, replacements, or deletions.
The DNS wrapper SHALL select src_users_simeonwarren_host_bot through the repository AL flow and keep
secret values in injected variables. DNS injection SHALL select the root’s existing
Terraform stage label. Real DNS credentials and Vault policy grants SHALL be
prerequisites for operational Terraform calls. RouterOS DNS credentials SHALL be isolated
from unrelated RouterOS resources. The package SHALL expose a format test that
does not authenticate to Vault or contact DNS providers.
This root packages the owner’s canonical DNS declarations
through the shared DNS module and keeps state in the DNS AppRole’s Vault HTTP
backend. It uses the dedicated dns_al configuration; Ansible retains its
separate al configuration and user_simeonwarren authority.
The root contains DNS resources only. dns_enabled defaults to true after
verified adoption. Keep it enabled to retain records; disabling it would
propose deletion.
The DNS migration procedure owns
credential provisioning, reconciliation, and recovery. The adoption record
contains import and verification evidence. Use the normal explicit
//users/simeonwarren/host_bot/tf:tf wrappers for DNS operations and the
//users/simeonwarren/host_bot/tf:tf_tests.fmt_test target for offline source
validation.
Operational Terraform calls require the DNS AppRole policy grants and credential fields described by the migration procedure. Provider configuration and authentication require real credentials and live access.